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Comparing Vulnerabilities: Toward Charting an  
Historical Trajectory of Disasters 
Greg Bankoff ∗ 
Abstract: »’Verwundbarkeit’ vergleichen: Auf dem Weg zu 
einer Kartierung der historischen Verlaufskurve von Kata-
strophen«. Disasters have two historical trajectories, one 
‘natural’ in that they involve one or more physical hazards 
and the other societal in that they are largely culturally de-
termined. They are ‘historical’ in the sense that both forces 
change over time. Charting an historical trajectory of vul-
nerability allows us to compare how skilfully different 
communities and societies in the past managed all kinds of 
climatic and seismic risks. A comparative perspective that 
does not start with the assumption that any one culture’s 
approach is superior to any other’s encourages us to learn 
not only from what people did previously but from what 
others do now, how especially non-western societies go 
about disaster preparedness, mitigation and recovery in the 
present. Finally, comparing vulnerabilities also encourages 
us to see disasters as more than purely destructive events in 
the short term and also to consider them as transformative 
agents in the longer term. 
 
Contrary to widespread popular usage, there are no such things as ‘natural 
disasters’ (BLAIKIE et al. 2004). There are certainly disasters but for one to 
take place two forces with their own separate trajectories have to come together 
at the same time and place to create an event. On one side, there is the hazard 
that can be purely natural like an earthquake, volcanic eruption and typhoon or 
increasingly more human-induced as in the case of fire, chemical releases and 
ozone depletion. On the other side are human populations whose social, eco-
nomic and political organisations are largely culturally determined. The manner 
in which social systems are structured leaves some people more exposed than 
others. Critical to discerning the nature of disasters, then, is an appreciation of 
the ways in which human systems place people at risk in relation to each other 
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and to their environment, a causal relationship that can best be understood in 
terms of an individual’s, household’s, community’s or society’s vulnerability. 
Vulnerability is determined by a combination of factors that include class, 
gender, age and ethnicity among others (O’KEEFE/ WESTGATE/ WISNER 
1976; HEWITT 1983; WISNER 1993; CANNON 1994; LEWIS 1999; 
TURNER II et al. 2003). This condition, however, should not be confused with 
poverty (WISNER/ YAPA 1995). Though the poor are much more likely to be 
affected by disasters, wealth, too, generates its own kinds of risks. One has 
only to consider how coastal location contributes to the exposure of expensive 
beach-side properties or how pleasure-seeking tourists are subject to all manner 
of ocean-borne perils. For example, the largest recorded number of Swedes to 
die in a single disaster in modern history occurred in Thailand in December 
2004 as a result of the Indian Ocean Tsunami (CALGARO 2005, p. 1). 
Natural trajectory of disasters 
Disasters, then, have two historical trajectories, one ‘natural’ and the other 
societal. They are ‘historical’ in the sense that both forces change over time. 
The fact that the nature of hazards varies over the years is perhaps less immedi-
ately apparent than the human element though nonetheless important. Geo-
physical and climatic conditions not only alter in the long term, over hundreds 
of thousands of years, but also within much shorter time spans that have af-
fected human societies within recorded history (LAMB 1977; BRADLEY/ 
JONES 1992). The variations in mean average temperatures associated with the 
Late Medieval Optimum (1100-1400), Little Ice Age (1600-1800) and Modern 
Optimum (since 1800) not only had (and continues to have) effects on agricul-
ture, human nutrition and population density but also has important bearing on 
the intensity and frequency with which people were subject to extreme events 
at any given location on the earth’s surface (LE ROY LADURIE 1971; 
BRAUDEL 1972; FAGAN 2000; DAVIS 2001; FAGAN 2004). More re-
cently, scientific evidence suggests a strong correlation between floods, 
droughts and related hazards and higher temperatures, the release of heat-
retaining gases into the atmosphere, and variations in precipitation levels 
around the world (IPCC 2007). Even the magnitude of hurricanes and typhoons 
in the Caribbean and Western Pacific has been linked to rising sea surface 
temperatures (EMANUEL 2005). Such arguments, however, are still contro-
versial and evidence suggests that floods in the past may have been just as high 
if not higher than they are today, and that sea-surface temperatures are only one 
of many factors contributing to the generation of hurricanes and whose tele-
connections or manner in which they affect one another are still far from fully 
understood (STEVENS 1999; LOMBORG 2001, p. 258-323; FLANNERY 
2005). 
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Nor can hazards be seen purely as calamities: One only has to consider the 
relationship of the annual flooding of the Nile River to the prosperity of Egypt 
or of the passing of seasonal typhoons to precipitation levels in places like the 
Philippines to realise their long term significance to human settlement and 
history. All in all, however, there are now impressive data series based on 
descriptive documentary (archival) and proxy documentary (indirect) sources 
for certain world regions that shed light on what occurred in the pre-
instrumental age. Much of this evidence has been collated into large data series 
such as EURO-CLIMHIST that contains 600,000 entries on weather-related 
events in Europe between 750-1850 CE, or the massive Japanese compendiums 
on earthquakes that chronicle such events since the seventh century (PFISTER 
et al. 1999; GLASER / STANGL 2004; ISHIBASHI 2004). 
Societal trajectory of disasters 
The historical trajectory of societies is much more apparent to perceive. Quite 
evidently people and the cultures they create have changed over time, and 
indeed are changing even in our own lifetimes. The question in relation to 
natural hazards, however, is to what extent these alterations made populations 
more or less vulnerable and what, if anything, they did about that vulnerability. 
Vulnerability recognises that certain people in the past may have been situated 
in more perilous settings than others as a result of a particular configuration of 
political, economic, social, ideological and environmental factors (OLIVER-
SMITH 1994; BANKOFF 2003). Attempting to view the course of recorded 
history from this perspective requires focusing on certain key elements in any 
society’s relationship to its environment: the number and distribution of its 
people, how they housed and fed themselves, and the level and ‘appropriate-
ness’ of their technological know-how. 
People 
The accelerated pace of change especially over the last century has transformed 
the nature and degree to which societies are exposed to hazards though argua-
bly the adoption of agriculture still remains the single biggest alteration affect-
ing people’s vulnerability (DIAMOND 1998, p. 85-191).1 The European con-
quest and settlement of the Americas with its concomitant drastic reduction in 
population levels and its subversion of indigenous cultural adaptation also left 
the ensuing societies far more exposed to risks that persist to this day and that 
was replicated, to a greater or lesser extent, in parts of Africa, Australasia and 
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the Pacific (CROSBY 1986; GRIFFITHS/ ROBIN 1997; COOK 1998). None-
theless, there is no denying the impact of recent changes. While the Industrial 
Revolution increasingly had important implications on people’s vulnerability 
from the second half of the eighteenth century, the size of the population af-
fected in world terms was initially not large and its influence felt only indi-
rectly outside of a local or, at the most, a regional scale. Nor should the impact 
that traditional societies had on their environments be minimised: perhaps more 
forests, for example, were cleared prior to 1950 than have been felled since and 
flood, drought and localised climatic change were very much features of the 
pre-industrial age as they have become subsequently (WILLIAMS 2003, 
p. 324). Clearly, however, the exponential increase in world population from 
approximately a billion and a half people in 1900 to over six billion by 2000 
and the increasing demands of a mass production and consumption world mar-
ket have created unprecedented environmental strains and magnified or gener-
ated new forms of risk consequent upon climate change, rising sea-levels, 
toxins in the food-chain and the generation of waste products among others 
(IPCC 2001). The scale of this human explosion must also be considered in 
conjunction with the mass migration of peoples, whether willingly or by force, 
from one part of the world to another. More than mere numbers, the European, 
Chinese and African diasporas over the past five centuries involved tens of 
millions of people leaving environments they were familiar with to settle in 
new ones whose ecological processes they poorly understood (BOLTON 1981; 
CRONON 1983; RICHARDS 2003; ELVIN 2004). The ensuing encounters 
created their own forms of hazard: rampant species colonisation such as the 
proliferation of rabbits in Australia and the ‘plague’ of sheep in central Mexico 
or the widespread soil erosion associated with the twentieth-century Dust Bowl 
in the mid-western USA (ROLLS 1969; CROSBY 1972; WORSTER 1979; 
MELVILLE 1994).  
Cities 
But, perhaps, the single most significant factor affecting global social vulner-
ability today is urbanisation with the number of people living in towns and 
cities expected to exceed those living in rural areas at any moment (DAVIS 
2006). There is no straight correlation, however, between increased urbanisa-
tion and heightened vulnerability. The concentration of population in urban 
areas rather than dispersed in smaller numbers across an extensive countryside 
means that people are increasingly less likely to experience a hazard but that 
many more people are adversely affected when they do. In developed countries 
where it is more likely that building and zoning codes are enforced, older build-
ings retrofitted to withstand particular hazards, emergency services better 
equipped and early warning systems more fully developed, the number of fa-
talities has declined dramatically in proportion to the total population even if 
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the cost in material terms may have increased as much as eightfold in real 
terms since the 1960s (DOSWELL 2003, p. 137, 144).  
The same, however, cannot be said of developing countries where the dy-
namics of urban growth are putting more people at risk faster than ever before 
in human history. Cities like Dhaka, Kinshasa and Lagos are approximately 40 
times larger today than they were in 1950; while more than 200 million people 
in China alone have moved to urban centres in the last thirty years and a further 
300 million are expected to follow in coming decades, raising the spectre of a 
‘planet of slums’ in the not too distant future (DAVIS 2006, p. 2-11). Many of 
these cities are fast becoming potential disaster zones through the sheer size of 
population, unmindful modification of the natural environment or expansion 
into areas unsuited for such purposes (MITCHELL 1995; IFRCRCS 1998, p. 9-
19). Again, it is the poorer members of society, particularly recent rural mi-
grants who are unduly put at risk. Not only are they forced to live in the most 
perilous surroundings – along eroding river banks, atop unstable slopes or 
beneath mountains of waste – but they stand to lose disproportionately most in 
a disaster that can strip them of all their assets in a moment (MITCHELL 1999; 
SANDERSON 2000; PELLING 2003, p. 46-67).  
The past, however, challenges are notions that contemporary and western 
ways are always better. An indigenous earthquake-resistant architecture 
evolved among the Inca in Peru, during the Byzantine and Ottoman periods in 
north-western Turkey, and in the Spanish Philippines where the style even 
came to be known as ‘earthquake baroque’ (OLIVER-SMITH 1994; DEGG/ 
HOMAN 2005; BANKOFF 2007). These were attempts to minimise losses of 
life and property by constructing buildings that took account of regularly oc-
curring hazards. An alternative approach, an ‘Asian way of coping’ with the 
constant threat of fire favoured in urban areas of Qing China, Tokugawa Japan 
and Mughal India, was to erect ‘ephemeral cities’, where people accepted the 
periodic loss of their dwellings and allowed for the easy dismantling and re-
moval of costly interior features that could be reused in cheaply constructed 
new structures (KELLY 1994; FROST 1997). 
Food 
A rapidly expanding and increasingly urbanisation world population ‘daily’ 
runs the risk of not being able to feed itself. While harvest failure has been 
intrinsic to all forms of agricultural endeavour throughout recorded history, 
more traditional farming practices tended to favour techniques that reduced the 
likelihood of famine (SCOTT 1976). Crop diversification and land fragmenta-
tion are important mechanisms for ensuring food security in communities as far 
apart as the Ivatan of the South China Sea or Swiss farmers on the slopes of the 
Alps (NETTING 1993, p. 34-41; BLOLONG 1996). In societies exposed to the 
constant threat of hazard, such strategies make good sense from the perspective 
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of local farmers who are mainly engaged in minimizing risk rather than maxi-
mizing surplus. Unfortunately, the increased commercialization of agriculture 
and the adoption of high yield and otherwise modified varieties of seed while 
increasing production enormously have adversely affected these types of adap-
tive strategies (SEN 1981, ‘RÈZE/ SEN 1990-1991). 
Moreover, the intensification of commercial farming has rendered livestock 
far more susceptible to risks especially in western nations (HEATH 1999). As 
small farms have been increasingly replaced by large industrialised agro-
pastoral enterprises over the last fifty years, the exposure of intensively con-
fined animals to hazards such as failed structures, non-functioning automated 
systems, and the spread of diseases have resulted in widespread fatalities 
(HSUS 2006). The extent to which intensive farming practices makes national 
food markets more vulnerable to the impact of hazards was graphically illus-
trated when Hurricane Floyd hit the south-eastern seaboard of the USA in 
1999. North Carolina, the state worst affected is also the second largest hog 
producer in the country with 90 per cent of its farms located on a floodplain 
and over 80 per cent of its ten million animals concentrated in facilities housing 
more than a thousand stock (TAYLOR 2001). In the event, up to 28,000 hogs, 
750,000 turkeys and two million chickens were lost in the subsequent floodwa-
ters (SCHMIDT 2000, p. A74). 
Technology 
Technology has often been seen as the appropriate response to hazard and as 
the most effective means of minimising risk. The extensive flood protection 
systems erected by the Chinese, Vietnamese and especially the Dutch over the 
centuries allowed agriculture and industry to flourish on hitherto marginal 
lands but at the cost of intensifying their exposure to hazard. Nor should the 
scale of these enterprises be underestimated despite the fairly rudimentary 
nature of the technology available to effect their realisation or the limitations 
encountered in organising large labour forces in the past (TeBRAKE 2002; 
ELVIN 2004, p. 115-164). Still the violent storm that breached the Nether-
lands’ sea defences on St Elizabeth’s Day 1421 inundated 500 square kilome-
tres, drowned 10,000 people, and turned central parts of the country into the 
inland sea that it remains to this day (LAMBERT 1971, p. 117-125; SCHAMA 
1991, p. 31-34). 
Serious attempts to predict such hazards began in the latter half of the nine-
teenth century with the development of the new sciences of meteorology and 
seismography. Great advances in weather forecasting were made during the 
next century as balloons, aircraft and then satellites added enormously to the 
quantity and quality of data available, eventually allowing for the formulation 
of computer-generated models of both immediate and more seasonal climatic 
conditions. However, the ability to accurately project the onset of the 
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1997/1998 ENSO (El Niño Southern Oscillation) event, the most powerful in 
recent history, did little to alleviate its deleterious effects on nearly 111 million 
people or prevent it from causing over US$ 34 billion in direct losses 
(NICHOLLS 2001, p. 137-139). Even the ability to forecast smaller-scale 
phenomena remains problematic. A severe hailstorm that struck Sydney one 
day in April 1999 left behind AU$ 1 billion in damages (NICHOLLS 2001, p. 
146). Most early warning provisions, moreover, remain hazard-specific and 
national in character and so lack a truly comprehensive outlook. One of the few 
exceptions is the Pacific Tsunami Warning System based in Hawaii that is 
composed of 26 international member states (TITOV et al. 2005). 
Today’s developing nations are still mainly incapable of finding the neces-
sary funds to underwrite the appropriate programmes of disaster preparedness, 
mitigation, relief and recovery. Small-island nation states like those in the 
Caribbean are particularly vulnerable to hazards such as hurricanes or volcanic 
eruptions that may overwhelm their entire resource base like in St Pierre in 
1902 (BRIGUGLIO 1995; ZEBROWSKI 2002). However, as Hurricane 
Katrina that devastated large parts of the southern USA in August 2005 proved, 
technological know-how and scientific expertise have their limits and western 
developed countries may have as much to learn about disaster preparedness, 
management and recovery from non-western developing countries as the latter 
do from the former (BANKOFF 2006). In fact, a country’s response to natural 
hazard may depend more on its social and organisational practices than on its 
wealth or resources. Through public education, national training exercises, a 
comprehensive early warning system, an integrated civil defence structure and 
firm government leadership, Cuba is better able to protect its citizens and re-
sources than most other states in the world (SIMS/ VOGELMANN 2002). 
Hurricane Jeanne that cut a swathe of destruction through the Caribbean in 
2004 left over 3,000 dead in neighbouring Haiti but passed without loss of life 
over Cuba (BERMEJO 2006, p. 14). Cuba now serves as a model for the 
United Nations and its government has even organised special medical brigades 
to provide assistance overseas in the case of disasters (SIMS/ VOGELMANN 
2002, p. 396). However, an offer made by Cuba to provide 1,500 doctors and 
medical supplies to the USA in the wake of Hurricane Katrina apparently went 
unanswered (BERMEJO 2006, p. 19). 
Charting vulnerabilities 
By drawing attention to the processes that put people at risk and how they deal 
with that consequent vulnerability, disasters provide a measure by which to 
assess how successfully societies adapt to their environment. Vulnerability, 
however, is not just a way to determine unsafe conditions in the present but it is 
also an important means of assessing how exposed people were in former 
times. By charting an historical trajectory of disasters, some communities and 
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societies in the past are revealed to have been skilful managers of all kinds of 
climatic and seismic risks, an ability that may have little to do with their appar-
ent cultural sophistication, level of technological knowledge or degree of mili-
tary prowess. Moreover, it may even point to alternative ways in which to 
mitigate such events in the future. As a conceptual framework, vulnerability 
reminds us that though natural hazards may be physical processes, disasters are 
quintessentially historical ones, that is they are the outcome of processes that 
change over time and whose geneses lie in the past. As with any historical 
process, a better understanding of their origins, realisations and outcomes will 
benefit from a comparative perspective that does not start with the assumption 
that any one culture’s approach is superior to any other’s. There is much to 
learn not only from what people did previously but from what others do now, 
how especially non-western societies go about disaster preparedness, mitiga-
tion and recovery in the present.  
Finally, comparing vulnerabilities also encourages us to see disasters as 
more than purely destructive events in the short term and also to consider them 
as transformative agents in the longer term. In fact, disasters may be significant 
catalysts of change in their own right, causing political, economic and social 
adjustments, triggering needed adaptations in human behaviour and the built 
environment, as well as perhaps contributing to the overthrow of dynasties, 
economic systems and even civilisations (TAINTER 1988; DIAMOND 2005).  
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